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In April 1999, isolation of avian influenza A (H9N2) viruses from humans was confirmed for the first time.
H9N2 viruses were isolated from nasopharyngeal aspirate specimens collected from two children who
were hospitalized with uncomplicated, febrile, upper respiratory tract illnesses in Hong Kong during March
1999. Novel influenza viruses have the potential to initiate global pandemics if they are sufficiently trans-
missible among humans. We conducted four retrospective cohort studies of persons exposed to these two
H9N2 patients to assess whether human-to-human transmission of avian H9N2 viruses had occurred. No
serologic evidence of H9N2 infection was found in family members or health-care workers who had close
contact with the H9N2-infected children, suggesting that these H9N2 viruses were not easily transmitted
from person to person. 
n April 1999, two World Health Organization reference
laboratories independently confirmed the isolation of avian
influenza A (H9N2) viruses for the first time in humans (1).
H9N2 viruses were isolated from nasopharyngeal aspirate
specimens collected from two young children who were hospi-
talized in Hong Kong during March 1999 (2). The children
were not related, were hospitalized at different facilities, did
not have any known contact with or link to each other, and had
not traveled outside Hong Kong (2). Both children had uncom-
plicated, febrile, upper respiratory tract illnesses and fully
recovered (Table 1) (2). Evidence for five additional human
illnesses attributed to H9N2 in Guangdong Province, China,
during 1998 has been reported (3). Detection of antibody to
H9N2 has been reported from persons in northern and south-
ern China (3,4) and poultry workers in Hong Kong (5), sug-
gesting that additional unrecognized human H9N2 infections
have occurred.
H9N2 viruses have been prevalent in domestic poultry
(chickens, ducks, geese, quail, and pigeons) throughout Asia
since the early 1990s and were also isolated from swine in
Hong Kong in 1998 (6). H9N2 viruses circulating in Asia have
been classified into three antigenically and phylogenetically
distinct sublineages (7). Two of these Asian H9N2 virus sub-
lineages, influenza A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (G1-like lin-
eage) and influenza A/Chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (G9-like
lineage), were isolated from poultry in Hong Kong (6). The
two Hong Kong children were infected by G1-like viruses,
influenza A/Hong Kong/1073/99 and A/Hong Kong/1074/99
(8). The H9N2 viruses that have been isolated from poultry in
Hong Kong are not highly pathogenic in chickens (8), whereas
antigenic analysis of the H9N2 viruses isolated from humans
in southern China suggested that they were more closely
related to the G9-like viruses (9). However, the G1-like viruses
contain internal genes that are highly homologous to those of
highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) viruses isolated from
chickens and humans in Hong Kong in 1997 (7).
The first and only documented human outbreak of highly
pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infections resulted
in 18 hospitalizations and six deaths among Hong Kong resi-
dents during 1997 (10-12). A case-control study identified
recent exposure to live poultry as an important risk factor for
H5N1 infection (13), and cohort studies suggested that human-
to-human transmission of H5N1 virus was limited (14,15).
The poor transmissibility of these H5N1 viruses among
humans and the elimination of approximately 1.5 million
chickens appear to have been key factors that stopped this out-
break (12).
Avian populations, including domestic poultry and water-
fowl, are the natural reservoir for all 15 known Influenza A
virus (FLUAV) hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes, including H5
and H9 viruses (16). Viruses with novel HA can emerge when
animal and human FLUAV genes undergo reassortment in the
same host or when viruses from an animal host, such as swine
or poultry, directly infect susceptible persons who lack protec-
tive immunity against the novel HA (17,18). In addition to
ability to infect humans, the transmissibility of a novel Influ-
enzavirus is a key factor influencing whether the novel virus
can cause an influenza pandemic (19). The emergence of novel
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influenza A (H1N1), A (H2N2), and A (H3N2) viruses led to
three influenza pandemics during the 20th century (19). 
The identification of two children who had acute infection
with novel H9N2 virus strains provided the first opportunity to
investigate their transmissibility and pandemic potential
among humans. We report the results of four retrospective
cohort studies designed to detect serologic evidence of H9N2
virus infection among family members and health-care work-
ers (HCWs) exposed to the two H9N2 patients, as well as
unexposed controls.
Methods
The target populations included HCWs at the two hospitals
where the H9N2-infected patients received care, as well as
family and household members of the patients. The infectious
period for an H9N2 patient was defined as a 15-day period
beginning from the day before illness onset to the 14th day
after illness onset (patient 1: February 27 to March 13, 1999;
patient 2: March 3 to 17, 1999). The infectious period was
defined conservatively to reflect the potential for prolonged
viral shedding, especially since children can shed influenza
viruses for longer periods than adults. Close contact was
defined as coming within 3 m of an H9N2-infected patient.
Participants were defined as exposed if they had close contact
with an H9N2 patient during the infectious period. An unex-
posed person was defined as having had no contact with the
H9N2 patients during the infectious periods. Unexposed sub-
jects included family members and relatives who did not live
in the same household as and had no contact with an H9N2
patient, and HCWs who worked on hospital units different
from those where the H9N2 patients were located and who
denied exposure to the H9N2 patients.
Study Design
We conducted four retrospective cohort studies of either
HCWs or family and household members of the H9N2
patients. During face-to-face interviews conducted in either
English or Cantonese, staff from the Hong Kong Department
of Health administered a detailed questionnaire to a group of
household members, family members, and relatives of each
H9N2-infected child. The questionnaire assessed the level of
exposure and contact with the H9N2-infected patient during
the infectious period, along with other suspected risk factors
for H9N2 infection, such as recent contact with poultry and
swine. A similar questionnaire administered to HCWs asked
about contact with each H9N2-infected patient during the
patient’s hospitalizations (patient 1: March 1-8, 1999; patient
2: March 5-7, 1999), and recent exposure to poultry and swine.
All participants provided written, signed informed consent.
Approximately 10 cc of blood was provided by each partici-
pant approximately 5 to 6 weeks (except where indicated) after
the onset of the H9N2 patients’ illnesses to test for antibody to
H9N2.
Serologic Testing
Serum samples from all study participants and the two
H9N2 patients were tested for antibody to FLUAV H9N2 by a
microneutralization assay at both the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, and the Hong Kong
Department of Health Government Virus Unit Laboratory, as
described (20), except that A/Hong Kong/1073/99 (HK/1073;
H9N2) virus, isolated from patient 1, was used in the assay.
Specimens from H9N2 patients were single serum samples
collected 35 days (patient 2) and 39 days (patient 1) after ill-
ness onset. The virus isolated from patient 2 (A/Hong Kong/
1074/99) was antigenically indistinguishable from HK/1073.
Sera were considered positive by microneutralization if anti-
H9 titers >80 were obtained in at least two independent assays. 
At CDC, a Western blot assay with bromelain-purified or
baculovirus-expressed recombinant hemagglutinin (rHA; Pro-
tein Sciences, Inc., Meriden, CT) from HK/1073 virus was
used to confirm each positive microneutralization result, as
Table 1. Clinical characteristics of two children infected with influenza A (H9N2) viruses, Hong Kong, 1999a
Patient characteristics
History, symptoms, 
signs on admission Treatment received Laboratory studies Clinical course Outcome
13-month-old girl;
possible failure to thrive; 
no recent travel 
Fever 39.5°C (1 day), 
poor appetite, 
vomiting, inflamed 
oropharynx
Cefuroxime
Paracetomol
Chloropheniramine
Pseudoephedrine -
Triprolidine (No antiviral 
medications) 
CRPb 0.12 (mg/dL) (normal <0.8 
mg/dL); WBC 2.22 x 109; 
AST 66 IU/L; 
CXR normal; U/A normal;
NP aspirate for influenza A EIA: 
pos; NP aspirate for
viral culture: pos for influenza A 
(H9N2), adenovirus type 3
Uneventful
No fever at
discharge.
Duration of
hospitalization 
March 5-7, 1999 
Recovered, no 
sequelae
4-year-old girl,
mild eczema, asthma, 
no recent travel
Fever 38.9°C (1 day), 
malaise, sore throat,
headache, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, 
diarrhea
inflamed oropharynx 
Cefuroxime
Cefotaxime
Beclomethasone
Paracetamol (No 
antiviral medications)
CRP 0.25 (mg/dL); (normal <0.8 
mg/dL); WBC 12.5 x 109
(82%N, 10%L, 7%M); CXR: nor-
mal; blood culture neg; stool cul-
ture neg; U/A normal; NP 
aspirate for influenza A EIA pos; 
NP aspirate for viral culture pos 
for influenza A (H9N2)
Persistent fever, no 
fever at discharge.
Duration of 
hospitalization 
March 1-8, 1999
Recovered, no
sequelae
aSource: Epidemiologic investigation by the Hong Kong Department of Health and review of medical records.
bCRP = C-reactive protein; WBC = leukocytes; AST = aspartate aminotransferase; CXR = chest X-ray; U/A = urinalysis; NP = nasopharyngeal; EIA = enzyme 
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described (14). Microneutralization-positive sera were
adsorbed with FLUAV H3N2 viruses to remove antibodies
that were cross-reactive among FLUAV subtypes before
retesting by microneutralization assay. Serum (50 µL) mixed
with 100 µg of purified virus was incubated 45 min at 20°C
and then 2 h at 4°C. Virus was pelleted by ultracentrifugation
(30 min at 45,000 rpm and 4°C). To remove residual virus,
serum was further adsorbed twice with 10% v/v turkey red
blood cells (RBC) (30 min at 4°C) and then centrifuged to
remove RBC (2 min at 12,000 rpm). 
At the Government Virus Unit in Hong Kong, microneu-
tralization-positive sera were confirmed by a single radial
hemolysis assay for H9N2 antibodies, based on a modified,
previously described protocol (21). HK/1073 virus-turkey
RBC complexes, cross-linked by chromium, and complement
were suspended in an agarose matrix. Sera were added to 2-
mm diameter agarose wells. After overnight incubation at
35°C, a zone of hemolysis around the wells indicated the pres-
ence of anti-H9N2 antibodies. Sera producing hemolysis were
absorbed with HK/1073 virus concentrate by mixing 15 µL of
sera with 5 µL of virus concentrate, followed by a 1-h incuba-
tion at room temperature. The mixture was then retested as
described. The absence of hemolysis confirmed the presence
of H9N2 antibody. Absorption with A/Sydney/05/97 (H3N2)-
like and A/Beijing/262/95 (H1N1)-like viruses was done to
remove the nonspecific zones so only H9N2 antibody reacted
on the single radial hemolysis plates. Sera were considered
positive for H9N2 antibodies if the microneutralization assay
and all confirmatory tests were positive in both laboratories.
Sera from the two H9N2-infected children were also tested
by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to detect
immunoglobulin (Ig) G and IgM antibodies to H9 as described
(14), except that HK/1073 rHA (1 µg/mL) was used as the
antigen. ELISA titers were calculated as the reciprocal of the
highest dilution of sera that gave an A490 value greater than the
mean A490 plus 3 standard deviations of six to seven negative
age-matched controls at an equivalent dilution of sera. A titer
>1,600 was considered positive.
Statistical Analysis
Univariate analysis of associations between exposure vari-
ables and antibodies to H9N2 virus results were done by SAS
6.12 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Serologic Response to H9N2 Virus Infection 
Patient 1 was positive for antibodies to H9 by all serologic
assays and had substantial titers of H9 HA-specific IgG and
IgM antibodies (Table 2). Low titers of H9 HA-specific IgG
and IgM antibodies were detected by ELISA in serum from
patient 2, but no neutralizing antibody response was detected.
Study Participants
The demographic characteristics of the study participants
are shown in Table 3. For H9N2 patient 1, exposed and unex-
posed family members or HCWs did not differ significantly by
age or sex. For H9N2 patient 2, exposed and unexposed
HCWs did not differ by age or sex. For family members of
H9N2 patient 2, the unexposed participant was older than the
exposed participants, but the number of study participants was
very small. In the HCW cohorts of both H9N2 patients, more
participants were women than men. 
Family Member Cohort Studies
Fourteen of 15 eligible persons were enrolled in the family
cohort study (3 exposed immediate family members and 11
unexposed relatives) of H9N2 patient 1. One exposed partici-
pant reported respiratory symptoms within the 2 weeks after
onset of illness in the patient. This participant’s serum was
obtained 3 weeks after H9N2 patient 1’s illness onset and was
seronegative for H9N2 antibodies. No other participant
reported respiratory illness. All 14 study participants tested
seronegative for H9N2 antibodies (Table 3).
All seven family and household members eligible for the
family cohort study of H9N2 patient 2 were enrolled (six
exposed and one unexposed family and household members).
Two exposed participants reported respiratory symptoms
within 2 weeks after onset of illness in H9N2 patient 2. The
unexposed participant reported no respiratory illness. All
seven study participants tested seronegative for H9N2 antibod-
ies (Table 3).
HCW Cohort Studies 
The HCW study population for H9N2 patient 1 consisted
of 30 exposed HCWs from 4 hospital units and 75 unexposed
HCWs from 14 hospital units. Three exposed and three unex-
posed HCWs reported respiratory symptoms (cough, sore
throat, or rhinorrhea) during H9N2 patient 1’s hospitalization
or within 5 days of the date of hospital discharge. All 30
exposed study participants were seronegative for H9N2 anti-
bodies. One of the 75 unexposed HCWs was seropositive
(Table 3). The HCW who tested seropositive for antibodies to
H9N2 had no known exposure to a confirmed H9N2-infected
patient and reported no contact with poultry or swine. 
The HCW study population for H9N2 patient 2 was 15
exposed and 23 unexposed HCWs from four hospital units.
One exposed HCW declined to participate. Four exposed
HCWs reported respiratory symptoms beginning 2 to 5 weeks
after contact with the patient. All 38 study participants tested
seronegative for H9N2 antibodies (Table 3). 
Discussion
These cohort studies suggest that influenza A (H9N2)
viruses were not transmitted from the two H9N2-infected chil-
dren to family and household members or HCWs who wereEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 157
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exposed to the H9N2 patients during their acute illness infec-
tious periods. As described for the avian influenza A (H5N1)
viruses (15,20), a combination of serologic assays was effec-
tive in detecting H9 virus-specific antibodies in two pediatric
cases of H9N2 infection. However, the same serologic assays
did not detect H9 antibodies in family members or HCWs
exposed to the H9N2 patients. Only two known exposed per-
sons, an HCW and a family member of one H9N2 patient,
declined to participate in the studies. The HCW who tested
seropositive for antibodies to H9N2 had no known exposure to
a patient with confirmed H9N2 infection or contact with poul-
try or swine. The timing of H9N2 infection in this HCW could
not be determined. 
Evidence for influenza A (H9N2) infection as the cause of
acute illness in the two patients includes the direct isolation of
H9N2 viruses from nasopharyngeal aspirate specimens during
the acute phase of illness (1) and the detection of H9-specific
IgM antibodies, suggesting recent infection with an H9 virus.
No other bacterial or viral pathogens were identified except for
isolation of adenovirus type 3 from patient 1. The significance
of the latter finding is unknown since this patient did not have
typical signs of adenovirus type 3 infection, such as conjunc-
tivitis. Isolation of adenovirus in this patient could represent
acute atypical infection, acute subclinical infection, or persis-
tent viral shedding from previous adenovirus infection. 
The apparent lack of human-to-human transmission of
avian H9N2 viruses and the low transmissibility of avian
H5N1 viruses among humans have several possible explana-
tions (14,15). The genomes of the H9N2 and H5N1 strains that
were isolated from humans were derived entirely from avian
influenza viruses; no reassortment with circulating human
influenza A viruses had occurred. It is possible that the avian
virus genome limits viral spread among humans. The molecu-
lar basis of influenza virus transmission among humans and
other species remains poorly understood. However, following
the introduction of an avian virus into humans, alterations in
receptor-binding specificity of the HA are likely necessary for
effective human-to-human transmission (22). Alternatively,
the children may not have shed H9N2 virus in titers sufficient
to facilitate transmission to other persons. Neither H9N2-infected
child had coughing or sneezing that would have enhanced trans-
mission to persons who had close contact with them. 
To improve specificity for detecting antibody for H9N2
over that of the hemagglutination-inhibition antibody assays
used previously (3), we used a combination of confirmatory
tests and an adsorption step to reduce cross-reactivity with
antibodies to other influenza viruses. Sera testing positive by
neutralization test were then tested by Western blot assay. Sera
positive for both these assays were further tested by neutraliza-
tion assay following adsorption of sera with influenza A
(H3N2) viruses. Sera that were negative for antibodies to
H9N2 by neutralization assay were not tested by Western blot
because of resource limitations. However, all sera from chil-
dren who were contacts of the H9N2 patients, as well as the
Table 2. Serologic responses of two patients from Hong Kong infected with influenza A (H9N2) virus
Patient
Age 
(years) Sex
Serologic anti-H9 response
Days post symptom 
onset
Neutralizing antibody titera Western blotb ELISA IgGc ELISA IgMc
1 4 Female 39 135 Positive 51200 18100
2 1 Female 35 40 Positive  6400  1600
aTiters expressed as the geometric mean of four replicate titers; titers >80 were considered positive for anti-H9 antibodies.
bWestern blots were performed by using a purified baculovirus-expressed recombinant HK/1073 HA as antigen.
cEnzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) immunoglobulin (Ig) G and IgM antibodies were detected on plates coated with purified baculovirus-expressed recombinant HK/
1073 HA (1 µg/mL). Titers are expressed as the geometric mean of duplicate endpoint titers estimated as described in Methods. A titer >1,600 was considered positive for anti-H9 
antibodies.
Table 3. H9N2 serologic results of cohort studies involving family members and health-care workers, Hong Kong, 1999
Patient 1 Patient 2
Family members Exposed (n=3) Unexposed (n=11) Exposed (n=6)  Unexposed (n=1)
Median age in year ( range) 30
(2 to 31)
31
(<1 to 39)
31.5
(2 to 55)
68
Male:female 1:2 1:0.8 1:1 1:0
Seropositive 0 0 0 0
Health-care workers Exposed (n=30) Unexposed (n=75) Exposed (n=15) Unexposed (n=23)
Median age in year ( range) 29.5
(19 to 51)
28
(19 to 59)
36
(24 to 56)
36
(25 to 50)
Male:female 1:4 1:3.4 1:14 0:23
Seropositive 0 1 0 0RESEARCH
158 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002
patients themselves, were also tested by an H9-specific
ELISA. Both patients but none of the exposed children tested
positive for H9 antibodies. 
Because of insufficient sera, the H9N2 patients were not
tested for antibodies to neuraminidase (NA). The N2 NA of
the H9N2 viruses isolated from patients is antigenically dis-
tinct from that of recent H3N2 human viruses, although some
cross-reactivity with human H2N2 and early H3N2 viruses has
been reported (8). However, additional studies from our labo-
ratory indicate that the apparent cross-reactive antibodies that
could be removed from some human sera by adsorption with
H3N2 viruses was not due to cross-reactivity between the N2
NAs, since these sera also reacted with a reassortment H9N7
virus (CDC, unpub. data). 
Because only two H9N2 cases were identified, we did not
conduct a case-control study to identify risk factors for H9N2
infection. Thus, the sources and modes of acquisition of H9N2
for the two infected children are unknown. The Hong Kong
Department of Health found that one H9N2 patient had very
brief exposure to live chickens 11 days before onset of illness
but did not directly touch the birds. No other contacts with live
poultry, swine, or other animals for either H9N2 patient were
found. There was no known contact or common exposure
between the two H9N2 patients. 
During the 1997 FLUAV (H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong,
a case-control study found that visiting a poultry stall or mar-
ket with live poultry during the week preceding illness was the
main risk factor for H5N1 infection (12). During that outbreak,
the Hong Kong Department of Health enhanced its active sur-
veillance for influenzalike illness and influenza viruses in hos-
pitals, general outpatient clinics, and physicians’ offices. This
enhanced surveillance system detected the two novel H9N2
infections. 
We were able to obtain only one convalescent-phase blood
specimen from study participants, which limited our ability to
document seroconversion. However, none of the exposed per-
sons were seropositive for H9N2. Currently, there are no sero-
prevalence data on rates of H9N2 infection in children or the
general population. One study of a cohort of poultry workers
in Hong Kong found that approximately 30% were seroposi-
tive for antibodies to H9N2 (5). Ongoing surveillance and
availability of H9N2-specific reagents should facilitate timely
identification of H9N2 infection and allow collection of paired
sera for further studies of person-to-person transmission. 
In addition to H9N2, other avian influenza viruses have
been isolated from specimens collected from Hong Kong poul-
try since 1997, including H6, H4, and H11 viruses (23). Dur-
ing April and May 2001, highly pathogenic avian influenza A
(H5N1) viruses were again isolated from live poultry in Hong
Kong markets (24). After chicken deaths were observed in
some markets, the Hong Kong government temporarily closed
all wholesale and retail live poultry markets for cleaning,
stopped importing poultry from China, and slaughtered
approximately 1.3 million birds during May 2001. The poultry
markets reopened in June 2001. No human illnesses attributed
to avian influenza viruses have been identified since the two
H9N2 cases in 1999. However, these recent events have
heightened the need to understand the public health risk of
H5N1, H9N2, and other avian influenza viruses. 
These limited studies suggest that avian influenza A
(H9N2) viruses were not transmitted from the two infected
children to exposed household members, relatives, or HCWs
in Hong Kong. However, H9N2 viruses are widely distributed
in avian populations, can infect humans, and could evolve or
undergo genetic reassortment with potential for increased
pathogenicity and transmissibility in humans. The recent
emergence of human infections with avian influenza A
(H9N2) and (H5N1) viruses highlights the need to improve
surveillance for influenza viruses in poultry, swine, and
humans, especially in Asia. Further studies to assess the health
risks posed by H9N2 and other avian influenza viruses are
warranted. 
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International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2002
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